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Abstract 
 Two of the most profound economic events of the past few decades 
were the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the rapid 
emergence of the market economy in China.  The paths of economic 
transitions in the two communist countries have been distinct.  China’s 
transition away from state socialism is generally considered a success while 
Russia’s is not.  Why did China have a better transition away from a 
communist economy than Russia?  This study compares and contrasts the 
evolution of the Chinese and Russian economic reforms over the past few 
decades.  It examines many differences and a few points of similarity.  
Differences include initial conditions and political leadership as well as 
external economic environments.  Nevertheless, despite Russia’s ongoing 
economic difficulties, both countries have made substantial progresses in 
their moves from communism to capitalism.  The two countries are currently 
converging on a similar economic model of state-led development.        
 
Keywords: Economic Transition, Shock therapy, Gradualism, Market 
Economy 
 
Introduction 
 The economic reforms in former Soviet Union and China in the late 
twentieth century have raised questions as to how each country has handled 
transitioning away from communism.  Russia and China each have a unique 
history, but both countries established command economies following their 
respective communist revolutions based on the idea of Karl Marx.  Those 
revolutions established the Communist Party as the dominant force in the 
political and economic life of both countries.  The Russian revolution of 
1917 produced a communist dictatorship under Vladimir Lenin and, later, 
Joseph Stalin and others.  The Chinese revolution of 1947 also resulted in a 
communist dictatorship under Mao Zedong.  At the heart of the communist 
ideology was a state ownership of capital and land.  Therefore, Russia had 
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been under a planned economy for nearly eighty years whereas Chinese had 
experienced a planned economy for about thirty (Marsh, 2005).   
 The collapse of Soviet communism was rapid and unexpected.  In 
1991 the Soviet Union broke into several newly independent states, the 
largest of which is the Russian Federation (Russia).  The immediate reason 
for the collapse was political: a clumsy, failed attempt of old-line 
communists to take control of the government.  However, a number of 
economic problems, some stemming directly from the failures of central 
planning, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In 1991, Russia 
pursued a rapid and radical transformation to private property and free 
markets.  It is called “Radicalism,” or “Shock therapy,” and it achieves 
irreversible reformations.  In 1992, Russia concluded that its political 
apparatus, particularly the Communist Party, was an obstacle to economic 
reform and political reform (democratization) was needed.  In contrast, 
China’s market reforms began far earlier in 1978 in a piecemeal, 
experimental, and gradual manner called “Gradualism,” or “Controlled 
transition” (Sachs and Woo, 1994).  China sought economic reform under 
the strong direction of its Communist Party.  It understood that the upsetting 
the political system would generate endless debate, competition for power, 
and ultimate stagnation and failure in economic reforms.  Unlike Russia, 
China feels that communist dictatorship and a market economy can be 
compatible.  China has preserved its state-owned enterprises while 
simultaneously encouraging the creation of competing private enterprise. 
 China has increased its economic standing in the global world 
exponentially since beginning its market reform in the late 1970s.  In 
contrast, Russia’s economy has seemingly declined since its transition to a 
capitalism in the early of 1990s.  Therefore, it is widely acknowledged that 
China has been vastly more successful than Russia in its transition from a 
planned socialist economy to a market economy.  Scholars on this subject 
mainly focuses on two primary causes of the different outcomes.  The first is 
the policy choice taken by the governments.  The other is the initial 
conditions of the countries.  In order to find the determining factor and larger 
role in the relative success of China and relative failure of Russia, this study 
compares and contrasts the evolution of the Chinese and Russian economic 
system and process of economic transition in the countries over the past a 
few decades.     
 
Initial Conditions 
 The initial conditions at the beginning of economic transition in 
China and Russia were very different.  The incentives and constraints created 
by the initial conditions had a direct effect on the outcomes of economic 
transition in China and Russia.  These initial conditions of the countries may 
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be divided into three general categories of difference: economic structure, 
political condition, and foreign influence.   
 
Economic Structure 
 At the onset of its transition in the late 1970s China was still 
underdeveloped and overwhelmingly agricultural.  About 70% of Chinese 
population were peasants.  It had a small and uncompetitive industrial base 
and minimal scientific capacity.  China struggled with the problem of excess 
population relative to the available land, resulting in the availability of cheap 
labor.  China was relatively resource poor.  China’s GDP per capita was only 
$150 compared to Russia’s $3,427 at the onset of transition in China and 
Russia (World Bank, 2015). 
Table 1: Table1. Economic Structure in China and Russia: Employment by Sector (%) 
China Russia 
 
Year 
 
Agriculture 
Industry & 
Construction 
 
Years 
 
Agriculture 
Industry & 
Construction 
1978 71.9 15.8 1991 12.9 42.3 
1995 53.4 22.7 1994 14.9 37.9 
Source: Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 1998; OECD, 
Economic Surveys: The Russian Federation 1995, 1995. 
 
 Unlike China, by the late 1980s the Soviet Union was a military 
superpower competing with the United States.   Russia was a mature 
industrial economy with an educated labor force and a world leader in 
science and technology.  Only less than 15% of Russian population worked 
in agriculture.  Russia faced a declining population and chronic labor 
shortage despite its rich natural resources.  Russian economy was 
traditionally controlled by large central ministries while Chinese economy 
was controlled by regional governments (Sachs and Woo, 1994).  This may 
provide an explanation as to why enterprise managers in Russia accumulated 
enough power to overshadow the central leadership while the Chinese 
leadership remained strong.  Russian agriculture was heavily centralized and 
inefficient, characterized by costly giant state farms and tiny peasant plots.  
Because of the heavily industrialized structure of the Russian economy, labor 
was overly specialized and difficult to reorganize.  On the other hand, 
China’s rural labor force did not face this problem during the economic 
transition. (Sachs and Woo, 1994). 
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Table 2. Corruption Index in China and Russia in 1996-2005 
Year Country Rank CPI Score (1-10 scale) 
1996 
China 50 2.43 
Russia 47 2.58 
1997 
China 41 2.88 
Russia 49 2.27 
1998 
China 52 3.5 
Russia 76 2.4 
1999 
China 58 3.4 
Russia 82 2.4 
2000 
China 63 3.1 
Russia 82 2.1 
2005 
China 78 3.2 
Russia 126 2.4 
Source: Transparency International, The global coalition against corruption, 2008. 
 
 Corruption was a debilitating factor for both countries, acting as, a 
drag on efficiency and a turn-off for foreign investors (Rutland, 2008).  
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 
based on surveys of international businessmen, Russia was ranked to 126th 
out of 159 countries surveyed in 2005, with a score of 2.4 out of 10, while 
China was seen as less corrupt, ranked 78th with 3.2.  The situation is 
unchanged since 1998, when Russia ranked 76th out of 85 with 2.4 and China 
52nd with 3.5.  Its practice is so commonplace at both high and low levels 
that bribery and clientilism seem to be the glue holding the political system 
together (Sun, 2004).  The character of corruption in China shifted after 1992 
as marketization took root and the role of connections (guanxi) diminished 
(Sun, 2004).  Leaders in both Moscow and Beijing claim that battling 
corruption has been a top priority, but their actions have barely made a dent 
in the problem (Rutland, 2008).       
 
Political Condition       
 Like quite different economic conditions, the political evolution of 
the two countries prior to 1980 was also very distinct although both Chinese 
and Russian elites saw the need for reform.  Although the Communist Parties 
of both China and Russia were similarly structured with centralized 
bureaucratic rule, noted by a large Party apparatus and a close state/party 
administration, there were important differences in the system.  The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) was rebuilding in the wake of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76), which had seriously damaged its organized coherence, 
governing capacity, and popular legitimacy (Åslund, 1995).  This event left 
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much of the administrative capacity of China in shambles (Woo, 1994).  
Deng Xiaoping, a dedicated reformer, removed his competitors from power 
right after Mao's death in 1976.  Therefore, there was no longer a struggle 
nor any alternative centers of power in China.  This strong leadership was 
necessary to carry out economic reforms as it helped prevent potential 
reformation short-circuiting by the party bureaucracy as they seek to advance 
their own interests.  Unlike Russia where power was decentralized in the 
hands of a few middle ranked party bureaucrats, the middle ranks of the CCP 
were governed by parallel rule where government officials are supervised by 
party committees (Shirk, 1993).  Moreover, the CCP established “Party 
groups” that took over the job of administering the government and 
supervised enterprise managers.  This practice helped to prevent the 
enterprise mangers from hijacking reforms to their advantage.  Thus, the 
CCP avoided the fate of its Russian comrades.  The CCP, unlike Russia in 
the 1990s, never let big businesses take over politics..   
 The initial political conditions in Russia were relatively not 
conducive to successful reform.  In the Former Soviet Union, power was 
spread through the top bureaucracy with too little power in the hands of the 
top leadership to make effective reforms.  Much of the economic power 
rested primarily in the enterprise managers who had enough room to act 
autonomously (Åslund, 1995).  The Soviet Union had experienced 20 years 
of stability in 1964-1982 under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.  He 
delegated much of the political power down to the industrial ministries and 
regional party secretaries.  Thus, much of the real political power rested in 
the hands of the nomenklatura, not in the leadership.  This period also 
produced rising corruption, bureaucratic ossification, economic stagnation, 
and a number of costly foreign policy adventures, such as the invasion of 
Afghanistan and a renewed arms race with the US.  In the 1985, Gorbachev 
started reforms very similar to those of Deng Xiaoping.  It was a state-led 
slow transition to the market that starts with letting small businesses operate 
privately.  The paths of China and Russia, however, diverge as Russia 
accelerates in the early 1990s.   
 While China avoided the breakdown of economic coordination 
because of its strong government, the result of the partial reform in Russia 
was the breakdown of economic coordination (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992).  Consequently, the Soviet elites were disbanded, forcing economic 
reform in Russia to be accelerated.  The ruling Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) was divided between pro-Union and anti-Union 
politicians.  The Communist Parties of the Soviet republics had been 
relatively autonomous by the late 1980s.  Their leaders wanted more 
independence as the economy was still centrally planned by Moscow.  This 
separation led to the August 1991 coup when the heads of three Soviet 
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republics unilaterally removed Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's elected 
president, from power.  Those were the heads of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus - the same republics that founded the Union.  When the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the new central government did not have much choice in the 
policy it could pursue.  The workable gradual reform could not be applied to 
the newly formed Russia.  The designers of the Russian market reforms 
aimed at destroying opposition inside the elite.  They called it "separating the 
economy from politics."  The opposition groups were called "red executives" 
who run Soviet plants and farms.  They were former Communist Party 
members seeking to retain centralized control over the economy. They 
eventually had been removed from decision making.  Therefore, the split in 
the Soviet elites eventually led to rapid economic changes that eventually 
failed to preserve existing linkages within the Soviet economy.   
 Ironically, the quality of Russian democracy arguably peaked in 
1990-1991, the last year of the Soviet Union.  In 1992-1996 politics settled 
down into an ugly standoff between a reformist president and an opposition-
dominated parliament, and after 1996, the level of competition steadily 
eroded from election to election (Rutland, 2008).  According to Freedom 
House (2005), the most well-known democracy index based on the level of 
political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) using a 1-7 scale, with 1-2 being 
“free” and 6-7 “not free,” Russia was ranked as “partly free” with a 3 for PR 
and 4 for CL from 1993 through 1997.  However, Russia’s grade slipped to 
4/5 in 1999 and 5/5 in 2000-2003.  Finally, in 2004 Russia was relegated to 
the category “not free” with a 6 for PR and 5 for CL.  Contrastingly, there 
has been less variation in the political climate in China, especially since 
1989.  Freedom House scored China a 7/7 from 1972 through 1977 when it 
jumped to 6/6.  In 1989 it slipped back into 7/7 and stayed there until 1998, 
when it rose to 6 for civil liberties and 7 for political rights.  Freedom House 
has kept that score for China through today. 
Table 3. Political Rights and Civil Liberties in China and Russia in 1975-2000 
 
Year 
Political 
Rights in 
China 
Civil 
Liberties 
in China 
 
Status 
Political 
Rights in 
Russia 
Civil 
Liberties 
in Russia 
 
Status 
1975 7 7 Not Free 7 6 Not Free 
1980 6 6 Not Free 6 7 Not Free 
1985 6 6 Not Free 7 7 Not Free 
1990 7 7 Not Free 5 4 Partly Free 
1995 7 7 Not Free 3 4 Partly Free 
2000 7 6 Not Free 5 5 Partly Free 
2005 7 6 Not Free 6 5 Not Free 
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings: 1972-2006, 2006. 
 
Foreign Influence 
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 China and Russia commonly relied on external integration as a key 
driver of their economic transition.  However, their experiences with foreign 
countries diverged.  Foreign investment in China was important in the 
success of its development (Kotz, 2001).  China had a surplus of labor in the 
late 1970s, the same time that Hong Kong and Taiwan were experiencing a 
shortage of low wage workers.  Their geographical proximity and shared 
culture allowed for China to integrate Hong Kong and Taiwanese supply 
chains, building up their industrial sector.  China not only emerged as a 
leading source of low cost labor in the region, but also opened the way for 
special economic zones near Taiwan and Hong Kong.  These successes 
helped make China’s reforms successful (Sachs and Woo, 1994).  Capital 
from Japan and the United States to China also developed skills in 
transportation, electronics, and tourism.  Foreign investment was 
substantially changed from only $7 billion in 1991 to $25.76 billion.  China 
also had a small foreign debt at the time of transition (Nolan, 2004, 184).  
China’s economic regeneration was led by an explosion of manufacturing 
assembly plants in coastal locations, importing components and raw 
materials and exporting manufactured goods to foreign markets, and tapping 
into its seemingly limitless supply of cheap labor. 
 On the other hand, the uncertainty that ran throughout the Russian 
political sphere affected foreign investment and aid at the time of economic 
transition growing.  In contrast to the Western response to the Baltic States, 
the West did not provide Russia enough aid to ensure that full economic 
liberalization stood on a firm financial foundation (Åslund 2000).  To make 
matters worse, political collapse also led to a collapse in trade.  Because of 
the 1990s slump and the breakdown of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) trading bloc, Russia’s share of world trade fell 
from 3.4% in 1990 to 1.5% in 2000, recovering slightly to 1.8% in 2005.  In 
contrast, China’s trade has tripled in every decade, upgrading its share in 
world trade from 0.8% in 1978 to 7.7% in 2005.  Furthermore, Russia was 
deeply in debt at the time of transition growing from 10% of GDP in 1990 to 
33% of GDP in 1995 to 95% of GDP in 2000 (Rutland, 2008).   
 Unlike Russia, the Chinese relied on an influx of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), while keeping portfolio investors at arm’s length.  China 
attracted an annual average of $12 billion FDI 1985-1995, rising to $78 
billion in 2006 (Huang, 2003).  Russia averaged only $1.3 billion FDI per 
year 1985-95 and $12.5 billion in 2006, while experiencing an annual 
outflow of capital far in excess of those figures (Rutland, 2008).  China also 
preserved tight controls on capital flows. The Chinese Yuan (Renminbi) was 
convertible on a current account, but not on a capital account.  It was pegged 
to the dollar after 1995, at a rate equal to about 25% of purchasing power 
parity (PPP).  Thanks to these controls, China has maintained its cheap labor 
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advantage and has prevented the speculative capital inflows and outflows 
that have devastated other developing economies.  China rode out the 1997 
Asian financial crisis largely unscathed (Rutland, 2008, 13).  In contrast, 
Russian reformers largely followed Western advice to pursue external 
liberalization because IMF credits were conditional on such policies (Stone, 
2004).  Russia lifted many capital controls in 1992-1994 and dollars flooded 
in, forming a parallel currency for most of the 1990s (Rutland, 2008).   
Table 4. Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows) in China and Russia (million dollars) 
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
China 57 1,659 3,487 33,787 38,399 
Russia N/A N/A N/A 2,065 2,714 
Source: The World Bank Group, Data and Statistics: Quick Query, 2009. 
 
 Thus, at the beginning of economic transition, the initial conditions in 
China and Russia were very different.  China had a more decentralized 
economic and political structure, a much larger share of agriculture in total 
employment, and a much lower level of economic development.  These 
reasons simply meant that China had a much higher potential to achieve a 
faster growth rate after transition, irrespective of its execution.  Conversely, 
initial conditions and especially political collapse in Russia stymied its 
economic transition.  Nevertheless, despite their different starting points and 
heading in different directions, the two countries are now converging on a 
similar model of state-led development in the face of common global 
challenges and opportunities (Rutland, 2008). 
Table 5. Reform Paths in China and Russia 
 Sequence Pace Initiative Spirit Western advice 
Russia Politics First Rapid Top-down Shock therapy Strong 
influence 
China Economy first Gradual Middle-up Controlled 
transition 
No influence 
Source: Rutland, P. (2008). 
 
Debates on Policy Choice 
 There is the contrast in paces of reforms in China and Russia.  The 
conventional wisdom is that China has followed a gradual path since 1978, 
while Russia has embraced shock therapy in 1992.  The Chinese were burned 
by a century of failed efforts at radical change and were thus philosophically 
committed to incrementalism (Fewsmith, 2001).  In contrast, Moscow had 
grown tired of decades of incremental change, and the crisis conditions of 
early 1992 seemed to leave Boris Yeltsin with no option but to embrace 
radical reform (Gaidar, 1990).  Because of the different initial conditions, 
Russia adopted the neoliberal transition strategy (NLTS: radical economic 
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reform) while China used a state-directed transition strategy (SDTS: gradual 
economic reform).   
 Some Western scholars doubted the efficacy of the NLTS from the 
start.  They argue the radical economic reform explains why Russia 
collapsed economically in the several years following transition.  As the 
evidence of severe transition difficulties in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the Newly Independent States (INS) mounted, the amount of the 
critics grew.  However, the critics have mainly drawn from the margins of 
mainstream economics.  The NLTS is popular with mainstream Western 
economists because they assume that private property and free markets are 
the optimal economic institutions, that privatizing property and freeing 
markets from state control is always desirable, and that this process should 
happen as quickly as possible (Kotz, 2001).  
 The critics on the radical economic reform insist that this type of 
transition strategy has a disastrous effect in the case of Russia in the short 
term for several reasons: 1) taking apart the old centralized system before an 
effective market system is ready leads to economic chaos; 2) fast 
liberalization following a tightly controlled economy results in a vicious 
cycle of inflation that is hard to contain; 3) tight fiscal and monetary policies 
to contain this result in depression and prevent the restructuring and 
modernization of industry; 4) a fully-open trade policy exposes domestic 
producers to superior foreign competition before they are ready to compete; 
and 5) in the absence of a legitimate wealthy class, control of state assets is 
gained by a minority of individuals - with little short term, easily 
measurable gain for society. 
 China, on the other hand, kept a dual system of prices under which 
state enterprises had to provide a certain quality of output at the lower plan 
price with an output above that level sold at the market price.  Central 
planning was not immediately dismantled, but was retained for the state 
sector although it relaxed over time.  While China welcomed foreign 
investment, it protected its domestic market considerably.  In summary, 
rather than seeking to directly convert its state-owned, planned economy into 
a private, market-based one, China used it as a base for launching a new, 
non-state, market-based sector (Kotz, 2001). 
 Nevertheless, mainstream scholars in Economics have proved largely 
impervious to the apparently impressive China/Russia contrast as well as to 
the arguments of the critics of the NLTS.  A good example of the reaction of 
mainstream economics to the China/Russia contrast was found in the World 
Bank study, From Plan to Market, which seeks to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the experience of economic transition (World Bank, 1996).  This 
study provides a window into the reaction of mainstream economists to the 
uncomfortable China/Russia contrast.  Considering the Chinese example, 
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they state the need to privatize is not equally urgent in all settings.  Slower 
privatization is viable.  However, the study quickly adds that slower 
privatization is not necessarily optimal suggesting that if China had 
immediately privatized, its growth rate would have been even higher than 
they achieved.  Despite its documentation of China’s remarkably rapid 
transition growth, and of the severe depression experienced by Russia and 
other CEE and NIS countries, this study avoids drawing the most obvious 
conclusion.  It does so by 1) downplaying the severity of Russia’s economic 
collapse; 2) attributing the differential China/Russia records to different 
initial conditions rather than different transition strategies; and 3) suggesting 
that China’s impressive achievements occurred in spite of, rather than 
because of, its different strategy (World Bank, 1996).  
 
Conclusion 
 Market reform began earlier in China than in Russia, and it was based 
on “Gradualism” rather “Shock therapy.”  The key elements of China’s 
economic reform were decollectivization of agriculture, establishment of 
township and village enterprises, price reforms, establishment of privately 
owned urban enterprises, creation of special economic zones, development 
of support and control institutions, and corporatization of state-owned 
enterprises.  Since the beginning of market reform, China’s real output and 
per capita income have grown at average annual rates of 9% respectively.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese economy faces remaining problems of incomplete 
property rights, under-development of financial institutions, lack of full 
integration with the world economy, and great unevenness in regional 
development.   
 The former Soviet economy collapsed under the pressure of declining 
economic growth, poor product quality, a lack of consumer goods, a large 
military burden, and agricultural inefficiency.  Russia has committed itself to 
becoming a capitalistic market economy since 1992.  Ingredients in its 
transition from central planning to markets include: 1) creating private 
property and property rights, 2) removing domestic price controls, 3) 
promoting competition, and 3) opening the economy to international trade 
and finance, and 4) ending inflation.  However, Russia’s transition to a 
market economy has been accompanied by declining output and living 
standards, increasing income inequality, and social costs such as corruption, 
organized crime, rising alcoholism, and reduced life expectancy.   
 In the case of Russia, a bad and messy transition meant an almost 
certain collapse during the 1990s as was also the case for all other NIS and 
CEE countries, who adopted the same model.  However, when looking at the 
big picture, the Russian economy has finished going through the predicted 
transition pain.  Although Russia still faces difficult economic times, it has 
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made substantial progress in its move from communism to capitalism.  It has 
rebounded strongly and consistently over the last 10 years and is set to 
continue to do so.  It will come close to China over the next 25 years, but 
current estimates are projecting its GDP to overtake those of UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada, and even Japan during that period.   
 Though the policy choice of China and Russia did contribute to 
relative success of the economies, this study argues that the initial conditions 
were the determining factors in the relative success of China and relative 
failure of Russia.  In addition, it is impossible to separate the initial 
conditions of the countries from the policy choice because the policy choice 
was the consequence of the initial conditions.  Therefore, there are cleaner 
and more complete explanations for why Russia's and China's economic 
transitions resulted in such vast differences.  Most of that can be summed up 
by a vastly inferior transition strategy in the case of Russia and China's 
significantly more favorable initial conditions for growth at time of 
transition. 
 China and Russia have taken different paths in their transition to 
market systems.  It may seem that China’s path of dictatorship and 
gradualism is superior economically to Russia’s path of swift transformation 
to capitalism.  While Russia has suffered years of declining output and 
income, China has experienced very high rates of economic growth.  
However, we must not be too hasty in reaching this conclusion.  The disorder 
arising from Russia’s abrupt transition to democracy and capitalism may be 
in the past, placing Russia in a stronger position than China to succeed in the 
future.  The Communist Party’s dictatorship in China may or may not last.  
History suggests that economic freedom often creates demands for political 
freedom, free elections, and so on.  Is China’s period of disorder still to 
come?  Or is a gradual path toward political reform by Chinese Communist 
leaders working again?    
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